Introduction
The objective of labor market policies is at least twofold: to provide benefits to those people who are unemployed in order to cushion their income loss, and to improve the allocation of workers to job openings in the labor market.
The former usually goes under the heading of passive labor market policy whereas measures that follow the second aim are usually referred to as active labor market policies. As table 1 shows, a considerable amount of money is spent on labor market policies in OECD countries each year. The interest in the effectiveness of those policies follows quite naturally.
Nowadays, there is considerable microeconometric evidence on the effects of training measures for individuals, mainly about whether it improves an individual's chance of finding a job, about how it has an impact on wages, and sometimes also about its stabilizing role on lifetime employment and income (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1999) . However, studies based on microdata cannot tell us what the aggregate effects of those labor market policies look like. As has been proposed by Garfinkel et al. (1992) , Calmfors (1994) , Schmid et al. (1996) , and the OECD (2005), the aggregate impact of labor market policies might be smaller than what evaluations on the individual level suggest because deadweight losses and substitution and displacement effects of labor market policies are not taken into account. This is why studies based on micro-data should be complemented by aggregate impact studies of labor market policies in order to arrive at sound public policy recommendations.
In this article I link individual and aggregate impact studies with an agent-based model of the labor market. In particular, I address three issues: a) I evaluate the aggregate impact of government training subsidies, which, as table 1 reveals, make up a considerable share of active policies; b) quantify how a policy that improves an individual's chances of finding a job harms Following up on the first issue, I intend to add to an existing literature that studies the aggregate impact of training policies an alternative methodology (as suggested by Freeman, 2005 , among others for policy evaluation) that complements the use of flow models and the estimation of aggregate matching functions (see, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Bellmann and Jackman, 1996, respectively) . The second topic is, in my estimation, a potentially interesting contribution that agent-based models can make in linking micro-and macro-level evaluations. Micro-evidence is not informative when it comes to judging the macroeconomic consequences of labor market policies.
In addition, a mere look at aggregate variables does not allow one to make inferences about to what extent the success of a program of a treated group of individuals comes at a cost for the non-treated. By its very construction, an agent-based labor market model allows the extraction of information on the individual level and the aggregate level. Thus, job displacement effects of labor market policies can be studied. The third result questions the use of matching functions as a key building block in flow models of the labor market. Matching functions relate two stock variables, jobseekers and vacancies, to outflows from unemployment (a flow variable). The properties usually attributed to the matching function are outflows as an increasing and concave function of the inputs to the matching function, and constant returns to scale. Moreover, those properties are usually seen as exogenous to policies. Here I raise the concern that if one takes a micro-foundation of the matching function seriously, namely, that policies target the agents' choices 3 Page 4 of 26 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t and that the properties are driven by firms' and workers' search decisions, then one should also expect that properties of the matching function change under the auspices of different policies. A failure to take into account that the matching function is endogenous to policies might lead to biased results in aggregate impact studies of labor market policies.
1 Butters (1977) and Hall (1979) were among the first to provide a microfoundation of the matching function on the basis of a coordination failure argument exemplified by the so-called urn-ball model. From that point of departure many roads have been taken to add more structure to either the demand side or the supply side of the market, or to introduce models of wage determination in order to study the properties of the endogenous matching function. Agent-based approaches to matching functions were made by Tesfatsion (1998) , Richiardi (2004) , and Fagiolo et al. (2004) . In Neugart (2004) I showed within an agent-based computational economics (ACE) framework what properties for an endogenous matching function arise if there is endogenous vacancy creation, endogenous search intensity, and a wage formation such that heterogenous workers are paid their reservation wages. I also hinted towards the possibility of policies affecting the properties of the matching function, an issue that has been pointed out by Lagos (2000) before.
The model with which I address the three issues is an agent-based computational model of a labor market with different sectors.
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Firms in those sectors have sector-specific skill requirements. Sectors are hit by exogenous 1 Examples of evaluations of labor market policies with an exogenous matching function can be found in Mortensen (1994) , Pissarides (1998) , and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) , who look at the effects of unemployment benefit systems. Job protection legislation, active labor market policies, and a negative income tax system were analyzed by Pissarides (2001) , Mortensen (1996) , and Coe and Snower (1997) , respectively.
2 Work in this direction has been done by Cao and Shi (2000) , Julien et al. (2000) , Burdett et al. (2001) , Albrecht et al. (2003) , and Smith and Zenou (2003) . A comprehensive survey of the matching function is provided by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) .
3 For an introduction to agent-based modeling, see, for example, Tesfatsion (2006) . The findings are that subsidizing training increases the outflow rate from unemployment to employment and reduces the unemployment rate. Furthermore, dividing the group of jobseekers into a treatment and a non-treatment group shows that a higher outflow rate of the treated jobseekers comes at the cost of a lower outflow rate of the non-treated. Finally, had I supposed an exogenous matching function, the aggregate impact of the government policy on the outflow rate from unemployment would have been underestimated.
In the following section I describe the model. Section 3 presents the results, and the last section summarizes my findings.
The model
There shall be numSectors sectors in the economy, allocated on a circle (see A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
The returns from production are fully paid out to the workers in terms of a fixed wage wage.
Initially firms and workers are randomly allocated to sectors. With probability r sectors are hit by shocks. All firms in the sector hit by a shock close down. Workers in those firms become unemployed. A number of firms equal to the number of closing firms is opening up in local labor markets that were not hit by the current shock. Again, those firms are allocated randomly to the new sectors. Because the number of firms is held constant, aggregate labor demand is constant, too. In other words, the shocks considered are asymmetric.
Firms that have a vacancy on the market and received applications randomly choose one applicant, to whom they make an offer. The worker always accepts the first offer that he gets. The order in which firms are allowed to make offers is random, approximating the simultaneous actions of the firms.
Thus, it may happen that a firm that received multiple applications cannot fill the vacancy because all applicants were hired by other firms, or that a vacancy is not filled because no worker applied. However, if they make an upfront investment in their human capital of the size of one unit, they would also qualify for vacancies posted in sectors 1 and 9, assuming that they are currently located in i = 0 and numSectors = 10.
A human capital investment of the size of two units would, in addition, qualify the worker for jobs in sectors 2 and 8. The human capital investment is costly. Acquiring skills that qualify the worker for the adjacent two sectors implies costs humCapInvCost. An investment in the worker's human capital that would qualify him for the closest additional four sectors incurs costs 2 · humCapInvCost, and so on. Workers may want to make upfront human capital investments up to the point at which they qualify for all sectors (0 ≤ numHumCapInv ≤ numSectors/2).
5
A worker shall send applications to all firms that have vacancies with skill requirements that match the worker's skills. An unemployed worker who makes an upfront human capital investment, but does not find a job in the current period, will have to invest in his human capital again in order to qualify for job openings outside his past field of work.
Workers learn how much they should invest in their human capital whenever they become unemployed or do not find a job. I model this as a process of individual reinforcement learning.
6
In the initial stage, a worker chooses the amount of human capital investment from the strategy set with equal 5 I assume that numSectors is an even number. 6 Another option to model learning on the individual level is genetic algorithms; see McFadzean and Tesfatsion (1999) or Dawid (1999) . Brenner (2006) extensively discusses the pros and cons of various learning models.
7
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t probabilities. Then, workers keep track of the payoffs that accrued to them after the choice of a distinct human capital investment strategy. As time evolves each worker experiences from market outcomes that some strategies work better than others. The performance measure is the average of payoffs of each strategy accruing in periods in which a worker had to look for a new job (whether successful or not). Let numHumCapInv denote a human capital investment strategy; then an unemployed worker k will choose a strategy h = numHumCapInv with probability
where λ > 0 is a learning parameter, reflecting the speed of learning, and payOf f Ave(k, h) is a worker k's average payoff for a strategy h. A learning mechanism like the one proposed in equation (1) has the characteristic that application strategies that led to relatively high payoffs are more likely to be chosen.
The role of the government is to subsidize training. The government refunds a share of the human capital investment costs to the unemployed workers. Unemployed workers receive a rebate of rebate = numHumCapInv · humCapInvCost · workerP olicy, having invested in numHumCapInv units of skills at a cost of humCapInvCost, with workerP olicy being the fraction of costs refunded. The government shall finance the policy through a tax on workers' wages. It tries to run a balanced budget. After every period, the government adjusts the tax rate that will be in effect in the following period such that the tax would have balanced the budget in the current period. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t duration of slightly less than a year.
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Each vacancy receives on average 2.6 applications, which could be considered too small given casual evidence on employers being inundated with applications, but note that by assumption workers send applications only to vacancies for which they qualify. The sum of human capital investment translates into 5% if measured as a share of total output, or put differently, an unemployed worker on average invests into almost three units of human capital. Tightness shows that on average there are 0.66 vacancies for an unemployed worker. Compared with crosscountry evidence this ratio seems to be too high (see OECD, 2001 ). Overall, however, the properties of the labor market model appear to be reasonable. Table 3 summarizes the findings of the labor market policy evaluation.
Increasing the subsidy for the training costs for the unemployed workers from zero to 50% in steps of 10 percentage points lowers the unemployment rate from 10.7% to 8.2%. The decline in the unemployment rate is driven by an increase in the outflow rate from unemployment to employment given a constant inflow rate from employment to unemployment. As it becomes less costly for the unemployed to invest in training, more training is undertaken.
The sum of human capital investments increases from 29.5 units to 49.8 units. Additional training qualifies the unemployed for jobs with skills that are more distinct from those of the jobs they currently hold. Consequently, they will apply for job openings in sectors that are more distant in terms of skills from those sectors in which they currently work. This is reflected in the increase in the average number of applications per unemployed person,
8 While it might be tempting to compare the outcomes of the model also with flow data on labor markets (see, e.g., Key Indicators of the Labor Market (KILM), International Labour Office Geneva, 2007), one should be aware of the sensitiveness of the simulation results with respect to the calibration time of the underlying model. In the future, less stylized models may investigate perhaps more realistic approaches where firms and workers are more flexible with respect to the timing of their decisions as the labor market unfolds.
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t as shown in the last column of table 3. Thus, a government subsidizing training reduces unemployment. Unemployment is reduced because lower training costs encourage unemployed workers to invest more in their human capital. As a consequence they qualify for job openings in sectors for which they otherwise would not have been qualified.
9
In short, the training policy reduces frictional unemployment due to skill mismatch.
Quite importantly, this result is not sensitive to the magnitude of the costs for the human capital investment. Increasing humCapInvCost reflects again the driving mechanism of the model, frictional unemployment due to a skill mismatch. The results are not shown in the table. However, as the costs for human capital investments increase, unemployment goes up driven by a lower outflow rate from unemployment. The decrease of the outflow rate is caused by a smaller amount of human capital investment that lowers the average applications sent out by a worker.
Whereas we have empirical knowledge on the size of most of our parameters listed in table 2, the choice of the learning parameter is debatable. Reducing the learning parameter to half of the size of the baseline model yields a decrease of the unemployment rate for all government policy parameters.
The lower unemployment rates are driven by higher average outflow rates.
Behind the higher outflow rates are increased human capital investments and, consequently, a higher average number of applications per person. However, although a less strong feedback mechanism distorts the levels of the endoge- 
Endogenous matching function
A matching function relates the two stock variables, vacancies and jobseekers, to the flow variable outflows from unemployment. In policy evaluations this relationship is assumed to be exogenous to the policies under investigation. Table 4 illustrates this procedure. After the comparable cases had been extracted, a Wilcoxon-test was applied in order to check for the null hypothesis of equal distributions of outflow rates.
In all five treatments, the average outflow rate is higher than in the nontreatment case where there is no government policy (see table 5 ). Thus, the policy improves the matching process in the labor market. The shift in the distribution of outflow rates is, moreover, statistically significant. Again, I checked for the robustness of the results when the learning parameter is doubled and reduced to half of the size of the baseline case.
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A matching function endogenous to labor market policies still seems to be an issue.
Job displacement effects
The model also can be used to shed light on the relationship between treatment effects on the individual level and the macroeconomic outcome. Al-10 Those results are not given in this article. Table 6 summarizes the mean values for the outflow rates for the treated and the non-treated group before and after the government policy was implemented. First of all, it can be seen that jobseekers of the treatment and the non-treatment group have equal outflow rates before the policy was introduced. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal outflow rates, as shown in the last row of the first column. A comparison of the mean outflow rates for the treatment group before and after the government policy was introduced reveals that on average the policy increases the job-finding rate
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Page 15 of 26 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t from 0.257 to 0.374. Testing against the null hypothesis of equal outflow rates, the difference turns out to be strongly statistically significant. Also in economic terms the effect is strong: the outflow rate of the treated group of jobseekers increases by 45%. If there were no substitution effect, the mean values of the outflow rates of the non-treatment group should be equal before and after the policy was introduced. This is, however, not the case. Again, one can clearly reject the null hypothesis of equal outflow rates. The substitution effect is also economically relevant. The outflow rate of the jobseekers who do not receive government subsidies is reduced by 12%.
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A sensitivity analysis with respect to the choice of the learning parameter does not change the qualitative nature of the results.
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What is the interpretation of the job displacement effect? In this model, it is driven by a reduction of the treated jobseekers' human capital investment costs. As the costs are reduced, workers in the treatment group invest more, allowing them to apply for jobs that are more distant in terms of skills from their current human capital resources. In those sectors where the treated workers would not have applied without government transfers, they compete for jobs with workers who did not receive transfers. Those workers might not get a job offer because a treated worker was given that offer. Thus, the job-finding rate of the non-treated group declines.
One may wonder how other policy measures fare with respect to the displacement effect. In an extension to the described model the effect of unemployment benefit policies on the transition probability of an unemployed worker into a job was analyzed. In order not to compare apples with pears the following approach was taken. With the parameters as in the previous 11 In more technical terms, one would claim that the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) is violated; see Rubin (1974) for an early discussion of causal effects in experiments.
12 Again, those tables are not included in this article.
A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t experiment, one can calculate the average budget of the government needed to finance the training policy, and this average budget was taken as exogenous to the unemployment benefit program. Then, the taxes for the employed and the transfers to the unemployed were determined endogenously given the number of unemployed in the economy. One finds that an unemployment benefits policy that has the same budget as the training policy does not affect the transition rates. The reason for this finding is straightforward. Contrary to the training policy, unemployment benefits do not give an incentive to invest in one's human capital. Thus, labor market frictions due to skill mismatch are not reduced. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t 
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A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t Note: N is the number of observations; p-value refers to two-sided test; parameters were set as in baseline model. 
